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Abstract— The paper is a half-way between the agent 
technology and the mathematical reasoning to model tactical 
decision making tasks. These models are applied to air defense 
(AD) domain for command and control (C2). It also addresses 
the issues related to evaluation of agents. The agents are 
designed and implemented using the agent-programming 
paradigm. The agents are deployed in an air combat simulated 
environment for performing the tasks of C2 like electronic 
counter counter measures, threat assessment, and weapon 
allocation. The simulated AD system runs without any human 
intervention, and represents state-of-the-art model for C2 
autonomy. The use of agents as autonomous decision making 
entities is particularly useful in view of futuristic network 
centric warfare.  
Keywords- Autonomous agent, BDI architectures, weapon-
target assignment, meta level plan reasoning. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In recent times information sharing and collaborative 
decision making over the defense networks have completely 
revolutionized the air combat operations [1]. Today‟s 
offensive forces are equipped with sophisticated electronic 
attacking (EA) or electronic counter measuring (ECM) 
devices (designed to interfere radar and communication 
systems), airborne warning and controlling system 
(AWACS) aircrafts, high precision air-to-air, air-to-surface 
missiles, high speed fighters, bombers, unmanned air 
vehicles (UAV) etc. To respond to these, the defensive 
forces rely on early warning surveillance or tracking radar 
that has electronic counter counter measures (ECCM), high-
tech command and controls (C2) that robustly assess the 
threats and efficiently allocate right weapons for engaging 
right targets. Modeling such decision making C2 is of 
utmost importance to survive with such technological 
advancement. 
An integrated air defense (AD) system is an aggregation 
of sensors, weapons, C2, intelligence systems, 
communications, and personnel operating under the 
command of a designated AD commander. The AD systems 
have progressed steadily over the recent years to include 
highly sophisticated computer-based software systems to 
assist and train the commander. Some of the examples of 
such tools are Air Force Mission Support System, 
PowerScene, TopScene etc. [1].  
Usually decision making processes of C2 involve an 
OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) loop or variants of it 
([2], [3]). Although, the OODA loop was initially originated 
from behavioral science, latter it was exploited for 
understanding the human participations in complex C2 
problems. Along with the OODA loop recently, the BDI 
(Belief- Desire-Intention) architectures of agent oriented 
approach are also becoming popular because of it′s 
enhanced capability of practical reasoning for developing 
intelligent software systems. It has the advantages from the 
user perspective in terms of both speed and ease of 
development of models.  
Any AD system is highly dependent on classifying 
targets, doing intent recognition and threat assessment (TA). 
Several multidisciplinary studies have been performed to 
solve such problems. The multiple attribute decision making 
has been applied for TA in [4]. In [2, 5, and 6], threat is 
assessed in terms of risk using dynamic Bayesian networks 
which requires the knowledge of prior probabilities. Since 
this information is not always available, alternative 
approaches such as fuzzy logic is seldom found to be useful.  
Today, most of the sensors and weapons of AD systems 
can perform multiple tasks or engagements. Operating such 
systems autonomously is a challenging task. In past, 
decision making process for such C2 are modeled and 
automated using fuzzy logic, dynamic Bayesian networks, 
decision trees [7], neural networks [8] etc. In those studies, 
TA and decision making processes are modeled separately. 
In this study, an integrated approach of TA prior to decision 
making (weapon allocation (WA)) based on the BDI 
architectures of agent modeling is proposed.   
Looking at the real applications of agent technologies 
starting from the sensor networking [9] to coordinating 
ambulances in emergency situation [10] or adaptive traffic 
control [11], one can think of applying these technologies to 
C2 processes of AD system. Technologies like normality 
analysis [12] to automatically understand complex 
environment and to detect abnormal behavior of events of 
interest can also be brought into the C2 system for 
situational assessment.   
This paper is mainly focused on two aspects, firstly on 
the modeling the C2 of AD system in terms of BDI 
architectures, and secondly, evaluating the system on the 
basis of correct decisions in a simulated environment and by 
the opinion of human operators. Two decision making 
software agents are discussed. First one is related with 
electronic counter counter measures (ECCM) against 
electronic jamming and second one is related with TA and 
WA.  
II. APPLICATION IN AIR DEFENSE 
Let us assume an autonomous AD squadron, composed 
of several smaller units (batteries) with variable AD 
capabilities (like short- medium- or long-range, low-to-high-
altitude, air and ground missile defense systems, AD guns 
etc., (e.g. an AD squadron composed of Patriot (long range 
missile), Hawk XXI (medium range missile), or NASAMS 
(short or medium range missile)), is deployed to defend a 
vulnerable area or point (VAVP) (e.g. runways, tank 
platoons etc.), against a point, area or maneuver air attack. 
Batteries are equipped with their own surveillance radar, 
tracking radar and command post (Air Defense Direction 
Center or ADDC). Central C2 is governed by squadron level 
headquarter (Air Defense Command Center or ADCC). For 
early warning, ADCC relies on central acquisition radar 
(CAR). The CAR starts tracking targets at larger distance 
(around 200 km).  Track information is transferred to 
ADCC. The ADCC classify targets and passed information 
to ADDC.  Surveillance radar starts tracking target at lesser 
range (around 100 km). This data is transferred to ADCC. 
The ADCC performs multi radar tracking and carries out 
track correlation and data fusion and send the target-list to 
ADDC. The ADDC prioritizes threats from selected list of 
targets (which may include aircrafts, helicopters, tactical 
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs etc.). The ADDC 
then perform optimal assignment of available weapons to 
targets. A multi-agent system (MAS) can be designed 
comprising of ADDC, ADCC and surveillance radar as 
agents. These agents depend on each other for achieving 
their goals. Figure 1 shows the requirements analysis of 
MAS using TROPOS (a tool used for designing agent-based 
systems) [13].  
A. Electronic Counter Counter Measures(ECCM): 
Today′s aircrafts (e.g. Su-25) are equipped with EA 
systems like jamming to reduce effectiveness of radars. 
Significant changes in surveillance sectors give an 
indication of jamming. The radar operator is capable of 
identifying whether at given time the enemy is using its 
jammer or not from received information like “target status 
(nt)” that includes target′s position, altitude, speed etc at 
time t.  
On the basis of nt radar operators decides their actions. 
The relative difference (RD) of target status (|((nt-nt+1)/nt )|) 
gives an indication of jamming. If the degree of jamming is 
very high usually the radar operator sends message to 
ADDC. On getting this information ADDC allocates 
interceptor aircraft to investigate about target. The ADDC 
sends this massage to the pilot for investigating suspected 
targets. The pilot prioritizes and engages targets by air-to-air 
missile based on its capability and availability and sensor 
performance (detection range). A heterogeneous range of 
sensors from ground as well as airborne are assigned to 
suspected target for tracking.  
 
 
Figure 1. Requirements analysis of multi-agent air defense system using the TROPOS concepts. 
All detected targets are not necessarily hostile. Targets 
are electronically identified using predefined codes. 
Predefined codes are distributed among friendly units. If the 
incoming unit responds correctly to these codes, it is 
regarded as friendly. If the response is contrary, the unit is 
considered to have "suspect" and thus invites tracking. 
B. Threat Assessment And Weapon Allocation 
i. Threat Assessment (TA) : 
For TA fuzzy inference rules are used [14]. These rules 
are required to be stored in the agent‟s beliefsets. The fuzzy 
inference rules have following form: 
if A1 is S1 and … and An is Sn then F is L1 
Ai and F are fuzzy variables and Sj and L1 are fuzzy labels. 
Ai ′s are the input variables; F is the output variable. For 
each fuzzy variable, fuzzy labels are defined as follows:  
Inputs 
 Range : { Close, Medium, Far }, 
 Velocity: {Slow, Medium, Fast }, 
 Altitude: {Low, Medium, High} , 
 Angle of Attack: {Low, Medium, High }, 
 Targets Types:{Very Lethal, Lethal, Less Lethal}, 
                         
 
Figure 2. Class diagram  of a surveillance radar agent that performs the task of ECCM and has been implemented in the JACK-agent oriented 
programming language. Each box represents a class stereotype, it has three parts containing the class label, attributes and methods. The 
arrows between the classes represent the association. The notations b, ev and p are used to represent the agent′s beliefset, event and plan 
respectively. 
 Intent Classes: {Strike, Interdiction, Suppression, 
Tactical Bombing, Strategic Bombing, Electronic, 
Close Air Support, Escort, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance}. 
Output 
 Threat: {Low, Medium, High}. 
The angle between the target′s velocity vector projection 
and the longitudinal axis is defined as the angle of attack 
(AOA). The intent classes membership values are function 
of an operational parameter called conflict level (CL) [2]. 
This CL represents seriousness of a situation, 0  CL  1, 
CL= 0 indicates peace time and CL=1 indicates full scale 
war. The value of CL is given by users based on their 
assessment of the situation to the system. The Target Type 
is divided into three fuzzy sets, very lethal (missile, a group 
of bomber or fighter), lethal (a fighter or a bomber) and less 
lethal (EA, AWACS and other aircrafts).  
The fuzzy system consists of fuzzy rules such as : 
 R1: If the target′s Range is Far and Velocity is Slow 
and Altitude is High and Angle of Attack is Low 
and Target Type is Less Lethal and Intent Class is 
Reconnaissance or Surveillance, then its Threat is 
Low. 
                        
 
 
 
Figure 3. Class diagram  of an ADDC agent that performs the tasks of threat prioritization and weapon allocation and has been implemented in 
JACK-agent oriented programming language.  
 R1215: If target′s Range is Close and Velocity is 
Fast and Altitude is Low and Angle of Attack is 
High and Target Type is Very Lethal and Intent 
Class is Strike or Interdiction, then its Threat is 
High. 
These rules are written on the basis of intuitive and 
expert considerations and then tuned by simulation tests. A 
Mamdani approach is followed. The input/output fuzzy sets 
are defined using trapezoidal and semi-trapezoidal 
membership functions. The „and‟ operator and the 
implication methods are the product, and the defuzzification 
method is weighted average. Total 1215 possible fuzzy 
inference rules (=35 × 5) are possible, but all rules need not 
to be defined because few of the rules unlikely to be 
observed in real situation. A minimal set of rules (e.g. a 
heuristic is defined as in rules of R1 and R1215 that 
represent two extreme situations of threat perception) are 
defined and other possible rules are automatically 
interpolated through given minimal set of rules. The ranking 
of each rules are performed in agent‟s plan-base. 
ii. Weapon Allocation (WA): 
Since 1959, WA problem has been extensively studied in 
operations research for further improvement [15]. Recently 
evolutionary approaches are found effective for WA [16]. 
Weapons are allocated to attacking targets based on target 
types, weapons‟ effectiveness, range, and availability. An 
integer linear programming model is developed. The 
objective function for WA is to maximize the target-value-
destroyed (TVD), which is defined as:  
 
 
Figure 4.  Surface plots of fuzzy inference rules for prioritizing threats.  The figures show the variations of threat as a function of (a) range and velocity (b) 
intent and target types (c) altitude and angle of attack and (d) target type and range while keeping other factors as fixed variable.  
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where yws  represents number of weapons of type w 
(w=1,..,W) allocated to target type s (s=1,..,S). Cws is 
constant matrix whose elements are determined as a 
function of kill probability and the constraints are 
(2)
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and (4) 0wsy , 
where Nws is number of w
th type of weapon required to kill s 
type target, NIw is number of weapon of type w and NTs is 
number of targets of type s. 
The models of C2-agents are implemented in the JACK 
[17] agent oriented programming language. Agents in JACK 
are autonomous software components that have explicit 
goals (desires) to achieve or events to handle. The intentions 
of those agents are modeled as goals. The goals are achieved 
through execution of some plans and furnishing some 
resources. Figures 2 and 3 show details of agent‟s structures 
using class diagrams (as one representative of unified 
modeling language). Figure 2 shows that SRA has to execute 
plans p1 to p4 to achieve the intention of ECCM. It uses the 
resources b1 to b5 which generates the events (ev1, ev2) that 
are prerequisite to execute plans. Similarly, figure 3 shows 
that the intention of TA and WA of ADDC-agent (ADDCA) 
is achieved by executing plans p1 to p3 and using resources 
b1 to b5 which generates events (ev1 to ev3) as prerequisites 
to execute plans. The agents use meta-level plan reasoning 
(MPR) process, as described in [18], for optimal decision 
making. The JACK software provides various library 
functions (e.g. relevant, context, getInstanceInfo etc.) for 
MPR. The relevant function is used to select plan associated 
with particular event. The context function is used to select 
the plan which is consistent with the agent's current beliefs. 
If there are still multiple plans left in the applicable plan-
base after using relevant and context functions, the JACK 
provides the getInstanceInfo function, which returns a 
PlanInstanceInfo object. This class has the def method 
which returns the rank (or threat value) of the plan. The 
ranking of each plan is computed by fuzzy rules. Each fuzzy 
rule generates a distinct plan. The plan with maximum rank 
is selected by the getInstanceInfo function. The events are 
posted either by the agent itself or by other plans. The 
events are posted by the plan (e.g. NewClusterPriorityEvent, 
in Figure 3) when the associated plans are executed. This 
 
Figure 5. Response of an ADDCA based on the KS statistics. In an AD scenario target may be in any 
situation ranging from low (far range, high altitude, slow velocity, low AOA, less lethal and surveillance 
or reconnaissance intent type) to high (close range, low altitude, fast velocity, high AOA, very lethal 
type and strike or interdiction intent type) threat label. Assuming a uniform (0, 1) distribution of 
occurrences of these situations the distribution of minimum (low threat) and maximum (high threat) 
order statistics are found using the KS test. The Inverse Gaussian distribution is found to be the best fit 
for both the cases with parameters given in the parenthesis. 
way, most potential weapon is allocated to the most threaten 
target. While allocating a weapon to the target the agent also 
checks its availability status so that multiple allocations do 
not take place. If there is slight change in the calculation 
process of threat ranking, MPR will take care of that. The 
MPR will always select the plan that measures maximum 
rank.  
III. EVALUATION 
This paper proposes two modeling approaches for 
evaluating the agent′s models, namely, logical and 
statistical. The propositional logic is used for the logical and 
techniques of hypothesis testing are used for the statistical 
evaluation. 
A. Logical Evaluation : 
The rules based on the propositional logic are used for 
representing the agent′s goals and their mutual conflicts. If 
an agent pursues multiple goals then the rules should 
automatically detect it as conflict situation. For the SRA, let 
the mutually exclusive goals (or plans) are p1: 
RadarIsNotJammed, p2: RadarIsJammed, p3: 
SendTheMessageToADDCA, p4: Frequency Hopping. The 
rules are defined as:  
    {ev1 Jammed} ,{p1}
k-     
 { p2   p3   p4 }             (5) 
         { ev1   Jammed} ,{ p2   p3   p4 }
k-     
 p1              (6) 
     { ev2   Jammed } {p2}
k+     
 { p3   p4 }              (7) 
where ev’s represents events, posted by the agent when it 
percepts significant changes in the environment. The 
equation (5) represents that if the SRA is Jammed (belief 
state denoted by  ), it may derive the goal to go for p2 or 
(denoted by  ) p3 or p4, but the goal to go for p1 is in 
conflict (denoted by k-). Similarly, the equations (6) and (7) 
also define the agent′s operating conditions and their 
conflicts.  Other possible conflicting goals situations are {p3 
 p4}, {p1  p2}, {p3  p1}, {p4  p2}, because if a SRA is 
found jammed, it may go for the plan p3 or p4, but should 
not pursue these goals (or plans) simultaneously though 
these are mutually exclusive plans.  
The state transition of agent is obtained at each time 
step for each plan instances (p1 to p4). The output of each 
time instance is a vector containing four strings representing 
the agent′s state < p1, p2, p3, p4 >. After five hundreds 
simulation runs no conflicting goal situation is observed for 
the SRA.   
Similarly, for the ADDCA, the plans and the conflicting 
situations are defined as follows: 
p1(N1): NewClusterPlans,  
p2(N2): NewClusterPriorityPlans,  
p3(N3): RedAircraft-InterceptorPlans, 
where each plan pi′s may posses a plan-base of Ni plans.  
{ev1  max(rank(p1(N1)))=p1(i)} ,{p1(j), j i}
k- 
 { p1(i) }           (8) 
{ev2  max(rank(p2(N2)))=p2(i)} ,{p2(j), j i}
k- 
 { p2(i) }           (9) 
{ev3  max(rank(p3(N3)))=p3(i)} ,{p3(j), j i}
k- 
 { p3(i) }         (10) 
If the ith plan combination has maximum rank then the 
above rules are true.  
B. Statistical Evaluation: 
The null hypothesis (H0) is assumed that the agent′s 
behavior (a random variable X) be characterized by a fully 
specified statistical distribution F(x). The Kolmogrov-
Smirnov (KS) statistic is used to determine the goodness-of-
fit of the underlying distribution pattern of the agent′s 
behavior. The KS statistic is defined as Dn = supx(|Fn(x)-
F(x)|), where Fn(x) is the empirical distribution function of  
random variable X of a sample of size n. The hypothesis 
about the distributional form is rejected at the chosen 
significance level ( ) if the test statistic, KS, is greater than 
the critical value obtained from statistical table. The KS 
statistic is applied for a number of statistical distributions 
and a ranking is performed for all of the fitted distributions. 
The fitted distribution with the highest KS rank is being 
selected as the characterized distribution and the 
performance measure of the agent.  
The system is designed in such a way that we need not to 
specify the statistical distribution in H0. The system 
automatically decides the best fitted distribution with 
estimated parameters from a library of distributions on the 
basis of KS statistic. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 An air combat scenario of smaller scale (200 km × 200 
km) is simulated where offensive force has one ground-
attack aviation regiment composed of one squadron (10 
aircrafts) of high speed fighter (e.g. A-10 Thunderbolts) and 
bomber (e.g. F-117) each, 10 air-to-surface missiles 
(Maverick), 15 cruise missiles (e.g. Tomahawk),  50 smart 
bombs, one UAV and one AWACS aircraft. The force is 
using electronic jammer (like directed energy into the 
enemy‟s search radar) for EA. Each unit of this force is 
approaching from different directions (with different speeds, 
altitudes and ranges), simultaneously towards a VAVP (a 
runway and aircraft shelters), which is protected by one 
squadron of integrated AD system comprising of one 
surveillance radar (capable of ECCM), one tracking radar, 
interceptor aircrafts two batteries (each with 3 units) of long 
(e.g. Patriot), medium (e.g. Hawk XXI) and small (e.g. 
NASAMS) range SAMs and Anti-Aircraft Artillery and one 
agent based C2 system.  
 Because of jamming, the surveillance radar receives 
wrong measurements of nt at time t. The nt is generated 
randomly using the Poisson distribution with mean 20. The 
RD values are computed at each time step and found that it 
best fits to General extreme value distribution with respect 
to the KS statistics. The calculated value of the KS statistic 
(0.6623) is greater than the theoretical value (0.136685 at 
confidence level 95%) so the H0 that the RD follows the 
specified distribution (General extreme value) is accepted 
and gives an indication of jamming and performance 
measure of the agent. It is observed that out of 500 runs, 231 
times (i.e. 41 %) the radar is found to be jammed and 91 
times the radar is found to send the message to the ADDCA.  
The ADDCA starts prioritizing once the targets reach 
within 200 km range from VAVP. Principal findings of the 
simulation results suggest that if fast moving very lethal 
target type (a group of fighter A-10 Thunderbolts with speed 
2.5 Mach) is very close (within 100 km) to the VAVP, its 
priority is very high as compared to a relatively slow 
moving target (Tomahawk missile with speed 0.7 Mach) 
which is quite far (beyond 200 km) (Fig 4(a)). Also if a 
lethal target (a group of bomber F-117) is coming with 
strike intention then its priority is more than a relatively less 
lethal target (EA aircraft) is coming with reconnaissance 
intention (Fig 4(b)). Also a target in a very low altitude (Su-
27 in a SEAD (Suppression of Enemy AD) mission) and 
high angle of attack is very dangerous than a target in high 
altitude moving in low angle of attack (UAV) (Fig 4(c)). 
Similarly, the threat of a low lethal target type (cargo 
aircraft) with the intention of attacking the VAVP 
(asymmetric warfare) at a very close distance is very high 
than a very lethal target at far range (Su-27) (Fig 4(d)).   
 The basic goal of the ADDCA is to prioritize threats 
based on estimated target s status. For example, let a plan 
detects target with far range, high altitude, slow velocity, 
low AOA, less lethal type and surveillance intention then it 
should assign low threat label, similarly, if a plan detects 
target with close range, low altitude, fast velocity, high 
AOA, very lethal type and strike intention then it should 
assign the high threat label. So the former plan instance is 
considered to follow the distribution of minimum order 
statistics and later one be considered to follow the 
distribution of higher order statistics. Now the distribution 
of these order statistics depends on the distribution of their 
parents. Assuming a uniform parent distribution to all plan 
instances the resulting distribution of minimum and 
maximum order statistics are shown in figure 5. The KS 
statistics are measured from the distributions of order 
statistics and the Inverse Gaussian distribution is found to 
be the best fit for both the cases.  
The SRA requires lesser computation time for checking 
its logical conditions than the ADDCA. The SRA computes 
the RD based on the current and previous observations; 
therefore, it requires at least two observations. Once it 
calculates the RD it checks the threshold . Similarly, for 
the ADDCA, planning time is fixed to 30 seconds. A genetic 
algorithm is developed for searching the optimal conditions. 
As expected, the search quality decreases with increasing 
number of targets. The decrease is not just because of the 
increase of the planning problem complexity, but also, and 
most importantly, because the number of available 
defensive combat resources and their configuration are kept 
fixed, for more targets to defend against. The system is 
tested for 30 weapons against 90 targets, up to this level the 
system performs effectively, above this level its 
performance reduces. So for larger operations more than one 
C2 systems have to be integrated. 
The reasoning process of the system is explained to the 
users and they found it logical and its conclusions sound to 
them relevant and useful. In future the plan is to conduct 
exhaustive experimentations of the system with diverse AD 
scenarios to extend the model for identifying the friend and 
foe as a function of CL and other rules of engagement (like 
visual identity) to further increase the user acceptance and 
usability. Also the proposed system will be evaluated with 
realistic scenarios (e.g. Operation Desert Storm). The aerial 
operations similar to those scenarios will be generated and 
the beliefs and decisions of the agents will be evaluated. 
This will help to develop air war-games where experts can 
evaluate the systems by changing their plans and strategies. 
For simplicity few operational choices used in this study are 
straight forward (e.g. target type, intent classes), in future 
these will be addressed more thoroughly. This system is 
conceptualized in computer simulated environment; the 
issues related to operational-level analysis can only be 
addressed in future.   
Similarly, inclusion of soft kill or non-lethal, options like 
decoys, chaffs, relocation of AD forces, deterrence 
measures, jamming etc. are left for future considerations. 
Further tests are to be done in future using two or more 
ADDCAs to see how they may negotiate for optimal 
utilization of their resources. To protect the system against 
byzantine attack the agents will communicate with each 
other with signed (or coded) messages which will be 
difficult to be forged by the traitor agents. Construction of 
the signature function will be a cryptography problem and 
addressed in future.      
V. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, modeling of autonomous intelligent agents 
for an AD system is presented using the concept of meta-
level plan reasoning of BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) 
architectures. The C2-agents take decisions of ECCM, TA 
and WA. The SRA decides when to change its frequency to 
defend the radar system against jamming. ADDCA performs 
TA and WA. The agents‟ logic is first formulated in the form 
of BDI architectures and then implemented using the JACK 
agent programming language. The behavioral patterns of the 
agents in different simulated environments are also 
presented.  
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